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How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War 
in an Incomplete Information Game 
 
This paper shows that the opportunity costs resulting from economic interdependence 
decrease the equilibrium probability of war in an incomplete information game. This result is 
strongly consistent with existing empirical analyses of the inverse trade-conflict relationship, 
but is the opposite of the conclusion reached by Gartzke et al. (2001), who reject the 
opportunity cost argument in a game-theoretic framework. As a result of this paper’s findings, 
one cannot dismiss the opportunity cost argument as the explanation why trading nations 
fight less. Instead this study reaffirms the central position of opportunity costs as the basis for 
the inverse trade-conflict relationship, thus implying that one need not rely on signaling. 
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 1 Introduction
Data strongly indicate an inverse relationship between con°ict and trade: Country pairs ex-
hibiting the most trade engage in the least bilateral con°ict. One (indeed the predominant)
reason for this inverse trade-con°ict relationship is opportunity costs. Opportunity costs
arise because nations tend to forgo trade with combatants especially when a war erupts. As
such, dyadic con°ict leads to a diminution of bilateral trade which results in lost gains from
trade for both nations. To prevent these potential gains from trade losses, trading nations
become more cooperative, thereby decreasing the hostility they exhibit between each other.
This explanation is know as the \opportunity cost" argument.
A recent in°uential article (Gartzke et al., 2001) claims that the opportunity cost argu-
ment is incorrect, stating \opportunity costs ... cannot deter disputes." Instead Gartzke et
al. argue scholars observe an inverse con°ict-trade relation because of \costly signaling."
In Gartzke et al.'s model a trading nation signals resolve \without resorting to military
violence" by threatening to cut o® trade, and as a result this signal leads to less high-level
con°ict and more overall cooperation. Gartzke et al. (2001) reach this conclusion in two
steps. First, within the context of an incomplete information game, they (erroneously) claim
that gains from trade do not lead to a reduced probability of war. Second, they show that
gains from trade do reduce the probability of war in a game-theoretic \signaling" model.
From this they conclude signaling is the \true" underlying mechanism through which gains
from trade operate in reducing bilateral con°ict.
We argue in this paper that Gartzke et al. (2001) are incorrect in dismissing the op-
portunity cost model. First, we show they are mistaken in claiming that trade gains fail to
reduce con°ict in an incomplete information game. As will be illustrated, they simply err in
their mathematical proof. Second, we argue that without potential gains from trade losses,
their signaling model would not yield an inverse trade-con°ict relationship. This means
even their signaling model relies on potential trade losses associated with con°ict. From
this we conclude that the opportunity costs of potentially lost gains from trade are indeed
1the important reason why scholars predominantly observe dyads to be more cooperative the
more they trade with each other. Our result is consistent with Polachek (1980) who derives
the inverse con°ict-trade relationship using a microeconomic model, as well as with Martin,
Mayer, and Thoenig (forthcoming) who derive the inverse con°ict-trade relationship based
on a more general mechanism design game. Our results are signi¯cant because they get at
the underlying political reason why trade helps deter con°ict.
2 Literature Review
To date a large body of empirical research studies whether trade has a pacifying e®ect on
international con°ict, or not. By employing various data samples, a number of regression
speci¯cations, and several measures of interdependence, the preponderance of this research
¯nds a pacifying e®ect.1 In addition, in recent years, as foreign direct investment (FDI)'s
growth exceeded that of international trade, a number of studies began to examine the e®ect
of FDI on international con°ict (e.g., Gasiorowski 1986; Gartzke et al. 2001; Polachek
et al. 2007). These studies show empirically that, as with trade, FDI has a pacifying
e®ect on con°ict, implying that FDI has become an important economic force mitigating
international con°ict. This second strand of literature, therefore, has increased the scope
of economic interdependence, making it even more important to understand the underlying
reasons for the inverse relationship between interdependence (e.g., trade and FDI) and
con°ict.
Despite the abundance of this empirical literature, little attention has been paid to
the underlying formal models behind why economic interdependence lessens dyadic con-
°ict. However, formulating how economic interdependence a®ects international con°ict is
a critical step toward better understanding this important phenomenon. Commenting on
the relationship between interdependence and con°ict, Mans¯eld and Pollins (2001) write
1Barbieri (1996), however, shows that trade increases the probability of con°ict. Many follow-up studies
have argued her results are not robust: trade shows a pacifying e®ect on international con°ict once more
appropriate model speci¯cations are introduced (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 1999; Xiang et al., 2007).
2\First, there is a need to improve the theoretical basis of claims about the in°uence of
interdependence on con°ict and to specify more clearly the causal mechanisms underlying
any such relationship" (p. 834).
Early models were complete information games which led to an opportunity cost ar-
gument. This means that nations protect gains from trade by avoiding belligerence and
maintaining peace. Other studies question this approach. For example, Morrow (1999)
argues that the relationship between trade and war is ambiguous. He argues that trade af-
fects con°ict not because of opportunity costs, but because trade signals resolve. Building
on this concept, Gartzke et al. (2001) likewise employ a signaling game in which economic
interdependence serves as a costly signal to demonstrate a state's resolve in an incomplete
information world. Their two-player game is as follows. First, state B decides whether or
not to retain interdependence. After observing B's decision, state A makes an o®er/demand.
Finally, B either accepts it, leading to peace, or rejects it, leading to war. It is an incomplete
information game in the sense that A does not know B's resolve (e.g., costs of ¯ghting). In
the separating equilibrium of this game, resolved states (e.g., states with low war costs) are
willing to destroy interdependence at the onset whereas unresolved states (e.g., high war
costs states) retain it, thus signaling their respective resolves.
In that same research Gartzke et al. (2001) also attempt to demonstrate the widely cited
opportunity costs argument, namely that the bene¯ts of interdependence deter con°ict, fails
to work in a game theoretical framework. They argue the equilibrium probability of war
is independent of the opportunity costs associated with interdependence. They claim that
since state A is aware of the bene¯t arising from interdependence with state B, it will adjust
its o®er to B to subsume this bene¯t.2 And as a result of that, they argue, the equilibrium
probability for B to reject the o®er (i.e., the equilibrium probability of war) should remain
the same.
2The intermediate step of reasoning is as follows: state B will accept A's o®er as long as the associated
payo® is no less than the expected payo® of ¯ght. B receives additional bene¯ts in the case of economic
interdependence but its expected payo® of ¯ght remains the same. As a result, A can subtract the bene¯t
of interdependence from its o®er and make B still accept the o®er.
3Their proposition on the e®ect of opportunity costs is incomplete, however. Since a
game involves strategic interactions of both sides, they neglect the e®ect on the proposing
state (i.e., state A). The bene¯t from interdependence to the proposer increases its payo® in
the case of peace, which also impacts the size of the optimal o®er. Therefore, it is not true
\opportunity costs generally do not alter the prospects of engaging in costly contests" (p.
400). Indeed, we ¯nd opportunity costs arising from economic interdependence can either
deter war or reduce the equilibrium probability of war in an incomplete information model
like the one examined by Gartzke et al. (2001).
3 The Model
3.1 The Basic Setup
In this section, we present a simple crisis bargaining game and show the existence of oppor-
tunity costs associated with economic interdependence induces lower equilibrium probability
of war. We illustrate this e®ect of economic interdependence by comparing the equilibrium
probabilities of war in two variants of the model ¡ one without economic interdependence
and the other with economic interdependence.
The presented crisis bargaining game is called ultimatum game and it is described as
follows. In this game, two players ¡ state A and state B ¡ divide a pie valued at W (e.g.,
a piece of territory). State A takes the ¯rst move and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er s.
Then state B decides whether or not to accept it. The rejection of the o®er leads to war
and the acceptance leads to a peaceful settlement as indicated by s. The expected payo®s
associated with each outcome are the following. Assume the winning state obtains W and
the losing side gets nothing. Let war costs be c1 for state A and c2 for state B. Further,
assume A wins with probability p. Therefore, in the case of war, the expected payo®s are
pW ¡ c1 and (1 ¡ p)W ¡ c2 for A and B respectively. In the case of a peaceful settlement,
the resulting payo® is W ¡ s for state A and s for state B.
4In the case everything is public information, in equilibrium state A will o®er s¤ =
(1¡p)W ¡c2 and state B will accept it, assuming B will always accept the o®er when it is
indi®erent. In this peaceful settlement, A gets pW + c2 and B gets (1 ¡ p)W ¡ c2. To get
more interesting cases in which war occurs with positive probabilities, we introduce some
uncertainty into this game. The critical assumption is that each state knows its own war
costs but only knows the other side's costs are drawn from certain probability distribution.
Following Gartzke et al., c1 and c2 are both drawn from a uniform distribution on the
[0;1] interval. With this incomplete information on war costs, we show in the following the
equilibrium probability of war is smaller in the case when economic interdependence exists.
3.2 Case I: Without Economic Interdependence
First, we examine the case with no economic interdependence. To solve this game, we
use the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) ¡ it requires specifying equilibrium
strategies and beliefs for both states. This game can be solved by backward induction. In
the ¯rst step, we ¯nd the equilibrium strategy for state B. This is relatively easy given B
makes the ¯nal move ¡ B will accept the o®er as long as its share of the pie is no less than
its expected payo® of war. Mathematically, B's best response is
Accept () c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s
Reject () c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s:
Note all the parameters in above inequalities are known to state B so no uncertainty is
involved at this stage of decision.
As the second step, given B's best response at the last move, we ¯nd A's best response.
Since state A does not observe B's type (i.e., c2), A's optimal strategy is to make an o®er
of s that maximizes its expected payo® given B's best response and A's belief of B's type.
5In mathematical terms, this means A chooses s to maximize the following expected utility
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = (W ¡ s)Pr(c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s) + (pW ¡ c1)Pr(c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s):
Solve above maximization problem we ¯nd s¤ ¡ the optimal s ¡ as follows:
s¤ =
¡1 + 2(1 ¡ p)W + c1
2
:
The ¯rst important result is summarized in proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.1. There is a unique PBE to this game. In the equilibrium, the strategy of
state A is to make an o®er s¤ =
¡1+2(1¡p)W+c1
2 and its belief about B's type is ¹c2 = 1. The
strategy of state B is to accept s¤ if c2 ¸ (1¡p)W ¡s¤ and to reject it if c2 < (1¡p)W ¡s¤:3
Since our main research interest is to compare the equilibrium probability of war, propo-
sition 1.2 speci¯es this probability for the case without economic interdependence, which is
given by the equilibrium probability of rejection of s¤ by state B. Mathematically, it is
Pr(war) = Pr(B rejects s¤)





Proposition 1.2. The equilibrium probability of war for the case with no economic inter-
dependence is 1¡c1
2 .
As is evident, this probability is solely determined by c1 ¡ state A's type ¡ and it is
positive.4 Next, we want to show this equilibrium probability of war is reduced with the
addition of economic interdependence into the model.
3Here we do not consider possible mixed strategies which exist in the case c2 = (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s
¤.
4This is because we have a zero probability to have c1 = 1, given c1 is drawn from a continuous distribu-
tion.
63.3 Case II: With Economic Interdependence
When economic interdependence exists between states A and B before the crisis bargaining,
each state receives a positive welfare in addition to its share of the pie were there to be a
peaceful settlement. On the other hand, in the case of war, economic interdependence will
be eradicated, thereby capturing the opportunity costs of lost trade when war results. This
is the key assumption employed in the model to test the opportunity cost argument. Let
b1 > 0 and b2 > 0 denote the bene¯t from interdependence for states A and B, respectively.5
Assume values of b1 and b2 are known to both states. The resulting change is re°ected in
the payo®s for the peaceful settlement outcome ¡ in this case state A receives W ¡ s + b1
and state B receives s+b2 instead. Once again, we solve this variant of game via backward
induction. First, the best response for B is
Accept () c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2
Reject () c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2:
Next, given B's best response and A's belief about B's type, A o®ers s which maximizes
the following equation
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = (W ¡ s + b1)Pr(c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2) + (pW ¡ c1)Pr(c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2):
When solving this maximization problem we get the optimal s to be6
s¤ =
¡1 + 2(1 ¡ p)W + c1 + b1 ¡ b2
2
:
The equilibrium result for the case with economic interdependence is summarized in propo-
sition 2.1.
5We do not assume b1 and b2 to be necessarily equal to incorporate the notion that states can bargain
along the contract curve.
6We need certain restriction on the parameters values to obtain the following equilibrium strategy.
7Proposition 2.1. There is a unique PBE to this game, and the equilibrium is comprised of
two parts. If 1¡c1¡b1¡b2 ¸ 0, A's strategy is to make an o®er s¤ =
¡1+2(1¡p)W+c1+b1¡b2
2
and its belief about B's type is ¹c2 = 1; B's strategy is to accept s¤ if c2 ¸ (1¡p)W ¡s¤¡b2
and to reject it if c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s¤ ¡ b2. If 1 ¡ c1 ¡ b1 ¡ b2 < 0 (so a corner solution
exists in this case), A's strategy is to make an o®er s¤ = (1¡p)W ¡b2 and its belief about
B's type is ¹c2 = 1; B always accepts s¤ in equilibrium.
The critical observation from proposition 2.1 is that, with economic interdependence,
state A adjusts its o®er by the amount of b1¡b2
2 . This result suggests that A will increase
its o®er to B should b1 dominates b2, which is the opposite of what is predicted by Gartzke
et al. Even in the extreme case where b1 is close to zero ¡ this corresponds to a situation in
which only state B bene¯ts from economic interdependence ¡ state A only cuts its o®er by
half of b2. Thus, even when incorporating economic interdependence, in no event will state
A cut its o®er to B by the amount of b2 as suggested by Gartzke et al. (2001). We will
discuss an intuitive explanation of this ¯nding after the presentation of next equilibrium
result.
The probability of war in equilibrium ¡ our quantity of interest ¡ is calculated as
before,7
Pr(war) = Pr(B reject s¤)
= Pr(c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s¤ ¡ b2)
=
1 ¡ c1 ¡ b1 ¡ b2
2
:
Proposition 2.2. If 1¡c1 ¡b1 ¡b2 ¸ 0, the equilibrium probability of war is 1¡c1¡b1¡b2
2 .
If 1 ¡ c1 ¡ b1 ¡ b2 < 0, the equilibrium probability of war is 0.
Proposition 2.2 shows the most important result of this study: the equilibrium probabil-
ity of war is lower with economic interdependence ¡ it is reduced from 1¡c1
2 to 1¡c1¡b1¡b2
2 .8
7This probability becomes zero when certain restriction applies.
8Recall that b1 and b2 are both positive.
8In the extreme case ¡ given (1 ¡ c1 ¡ b1 ¡ b2 < 0) is satis¯ed ¡ a peaceful settlement will
be assured. This mathematical result clearly bears out the opportunity costs argument:
compared to their counterparts interdependent states are less likely to ¯ght due to the fear
of losing economic bene¯ts. This is in contrast to Gartzke et al's claim that the probability
of war remains the same with economic interdependence.
In addition, proposition 2.2 suggests that the probability of war is negatively correlated
with the economic bene¯t for each interdependent state ¡ b1 and b2. This theoretical result
is very consistent with the empirical ¯ndings that dyadic trade, which is used to approximate
bene¯ts of trade for each state, is negatively related to the probability of war. Therefore,
proposition 2.2 provides a theoretical foundation for existing empirical research on trade
and con°ict, and at the same time it is buttressed by existing empirical evidence.
The discussion thus far has focused on showing the technical details. Next, we o®er
an intuitive explanation. Recall Gartzke et al.'s numerical example (pages 398-400 of their
paper): The pie to be divided (W) is $100 and the incomplete information o®er to B is s
(which in their notation is denoted as d). As such, war is avoided if B receives s, and A keeps
($100¡s). In the case B rejects s, each state pays $20 for ¯ghting and wins with an equal
probability. Given war costs for B are uniformly distributed between 0 and 40, Gartzke et
al. incorrectly calculated s¤ = 30. Our equilibrium solution gives s¤ = 40. Their answer is
incorrect because the expected payo® for A is 50 when s¤ = 30 and is 52.5 when s¤ = 40.9
The latter case is an apparent pro¯t gain for A. Next, they suppose interdependence.
They \assume that interdependent dyads are those that derive some bene¯t from economic
linkage" (p 400), which they assume to be $10 for each nation. Because \not ¯ghting is
more bene¯cial in interdependent dyads, and B should more often prefer A's" o®er rather
than ¯ght, they mistakenly claim \A simply demands commensurately more" leading A
to o®er (s = $100 ¡ (s ¡ $10)), which neglects A's own incentive to induce its opponent
not to ¯ght. With economic interdependence, A o®ers s¤ = 40, which gives A a higher
9To calculate A's expected payo®, simply use (100 ¡ s
¤)Pr(c2 ¸ 50 ¡ s
¤) + 30Pr(c2 < 50 ¡ s
¤).
9expected payo® than s¤ = 20.10 In short, Gartzke et al. erroneously ¯xed the equilibrium
probability at 0:5 and accordingly adjusted A's optimal o®er. As such they have violated
the expected utility calculation and have turned the incomplete information game into a
complete information game.
4 Discussion
The formal models in the last section show that bene¯ts from economic interdependence
(i.e., bi) explain the reduced probability of war in equilibrium. In other words, our ¯nding
means economic interdependence ¡ more precisely, the bene¯t from economic interdependence¡
deters international con°ict, which buttresses the traditional opportunity cost argument of
trade. This result is important for two reasons. First, it shows the opportunity cost argu-
ment is valid in a game-theoretical framework, which is in contrast to the claim by Gartzke
et al (2001). Therefore, the opportunity cost argument can explain why economic interde-
pendence decreases the probability of war. Second, it provides a theoretical foundation for
the empirical result that trade has a pacifying e®ect on con°ict, and as a result implies that
it is not necessary to resort to the costly signaling argument to explain why trade deters
con°ict.
The discussion thus far treats the two mechanisms (i.e., incomplete information and
costly signaling) as if they build upon very di®erent assumptions and employ distinctive
approaches. A closer scrutiny shows some commonality underlies both mechanisms, namely
the concept of opportunity costs is critical for both mechanisms to work. This is clearly
the case for the opportunity cost argument, which essentially emphasizes how the economic
dimension (i.e., opportunity costs) a®ects the political dimension (i.e., foreign policies). For
the costly signaling proposition, opportunity costs also comprises an essential part of the
argument. To see this, ¯rst consider Spence's (1973) original work which ¯rst proposes the
costly signaling argument (albeit in the labor market rather than in a political setting).
10The expected payo®s are 70 and 60, respectively.
10Here ability is unobserved, but potential employees can signal their respective abilities
to employers through acquiring di®erent levels of education. In equilibrium high ability
workers obtain more education than low ability workers. The model's critical underlying
assumption is more able workers are willing to purchase costly education by forgoing wages
when they are young (opportunity costs) to signal their high productivity. In Gartzke et
al.'s costly signaling model, resolved states signal their willingness to ¯ght by threatening to
pass the costs of cutting o® trade, thereby forgoing gains from trade. Unresolved states who
are unwilling to ¯ght do not forgo the bene¯ts of trade, thereby retaining their economic
interdependence. The key assumption in this case is that the loss of interdependence is
costly (i.e., opportunity costs) and that the action to retain interdependence is negatively
correlated with state resolve. This discussion shows the existence of opportunity costs is
indispensable, which suggests Gartzke et al.'s costly signaling model builds upon the old
concept ¡ opportunity costs. Gartzke et al. imply as much when they write \interdependent
states can use opportunity costs as costly signals demonstrating resolve" (p 404). Put
simply, this means that Gartzke et al.'s costly signaling model relies on potential trade
losses associated with con°ict.
Gartzke et al. claim:
\One might argue that our [Gartzke et al.'s] research design errs in light of
previous studies that appear to support the opportunity costs model. How do
we [Gartzke et al.] show that peace is caused by signaling? The problem is really
with previous [incomplete information game theory] studies that assume (but
fail to demonstrate) that a negative relationship results from opportunity costs.
Rigorous theory shows that a negative relationship is the wrong hypothesis for
the opportunity cost model, that opportunity costs predict no relationship." (p.
410)
Our paper illustrates that the opportunity cost model does predict such a relationship, and
as a result Gartzke et al. are incorrect to claim \opportunity costs will typically fail to
11preclude militarized disputes" between interdependent states (p. 391). Indeed opportunity
costs play a major role here, and in their signaling model, as well.
12Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1.
First, state B will accept an o®er s if
s ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ c2
c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s
and will reject it if
c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s:
Second, the expected payo® for state A with an o®er s given B's best response and A's
belief about B's type is
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = (W ¡ s)Pr(c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s) + (pW ¡ c1)Pr(c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s)
= (W ¡ s)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)W + s) + (pW ¡ c1)((1 ¡ p)W ¡ s):
Take the ¯rst order derivative of Eu1(s ¸ 0) w.r.t. s and let it equal to 0,
d
ds
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = ¡(1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)W + s¤) + (W ¡ s¤) ¡ (pW ¡ c1) = 0
¡1 ¡ 2s¤ + 2(1 ¡ p)W + c1 = 0
s¤ =
¡1 + 2(1 ¡ p)W + c1
2
:
Take the second order derivative and get
d2
(ds)2Eu1(s ¸ 0) = ¡2 < 0;
so we have a maximum.11
Third, we show this is the unique PBE to this game. To this end, we need to consider
two cases in which (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s · 0 and (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¸ 1. In the ¯rst case,
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = W ¡ s;
so the best response is to choose ^ s = (1 ¡ p)W. In the second case,
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = pW ¡ c1;
11Obviously, if (¡1 + 2(1 ¡ p)W + c1) < 0, we set s
¤ = 0.
13which is independent of s. Let ~ s = (1 ¡ p)W ¡ 1. It is easy to check
Eu1(^ s) ¸ Eu1(~ s):
But, since we have




it shows s¤ maximizes Eu1(s ¸ 0) for all s ¸ 0 and s¤ is the unique equilibrium strategy
for state A.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
First, state B will accept an o®er s if
s + b2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ c2
c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2
and will reject it if
c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2:
Second, the expected payo® for state A with an o®er s given B's strategy and A's belief
about B's type is
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = (W ¡ s + b1)Pr(c2 ¸ (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2) + (pW ¡ c1)Pr(c2 < (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2)
= (W ¡ s + b1)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)W + s + b2) + (pW ¡ c1)((1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2):
Take the ¯rst order derivative of Eu1(s ¸ 0) w.r.t. s and let it equal to 0,
d
ds
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = ¡(1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)W + s¤ + b2) + (W ¡ s¤ + b1) ¡ (pW ¡ c1) = 0
¡1 + 2(1 ¡ p)W ¡ 2s¤ + c1 + b1 ¡ b2 = 0
s¤ =
¡1 + 2(1 ¡ p)W + c1 + b1 ¡ b2
2
:
Take the second order derivative and get
d2
(ds)2Eu1(s ¸ 0) = ¡2 < 0;
so we have a maximum.12
Third, we show the equilibrium depends upon values of certain parameters. To this end,
12Once again, if (¡1 + 2(1 ¡ p)W + c1 + b1 ¡ b2) < 0, we set s
¤ = 0.
14we need to consider two cases in which (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2 · 0 and (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s ¡ b2 ¸ 1.
In the ¯rst case,
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = W ¡ s + b1;
so the best response is to choose ^ s = (1 ¡ p)W ¡ b2. In the second case,
Eu1(s ¸ 0) = pW ¡ c1;
which is independent of s. Let ~ s = (1 ¡ p)W ¡ b2 ¡ 1. It is easy to check
Eu1(^ s) ¸ Eu1(~ s):
In order for s¤ to be an equilibrium strategy, we need
0 · (1 ¡ p)W ¡ s¤ ¡ b2 · 1
0 ·
1 ¡ c1 ¡ b1 ¡ b2
2
· 1:
So the condition needed is
1 ¡ c1 ¡ b1 ¡ b2 ¸ 0;
since 1¡c1¡b1¡b2
2 · 1 is satis¯ed by assumption. On the other hand, if
1 ¡ c1 ¡ b1 ¡ b2 < 0;
we get equilibrium strategy s¤ = ^ s = (1 ¡ p)W ¡ b2.
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